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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustainable 
Development? 
Lessons from the EU’s Economic Partnership 
Agreement with the Caribbean 
The European Union’s Economic Partnership Agree-
ment (EPA) with fifteen Caribbean states came into 
effect in 2008. The deal was negotiated jointly by the 
members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM: 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) and the Domini-
can Republic, operating jointly as the Caribbean Forum 
of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (CARIFORUM). 
The document’s objective, as already laid out in the 
Cotonou Agreement of June 2000, extends far beyond 
the usual scope of a free trade agreement. The Euro-
pean Union’s economic partnership agreements with 
African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP states) are 
explicitly intended to serve the ultimate objective of 
sustainable development, promote integration within 
the partner region, and link trade policy with develop-
ment instruments. In other words, the European Union 
and the ACP states are seeking to establish a new class 
of agreement that moves beyond purely economic 
goals to address the sustainability factors that the 
international community has agreed to prioritise: 
social equilibrium and respect for the environment. 
At the same time, the EPAs are supposed to intro-
duce the principle of reciprocity into the European 
Union’s trade relations with the ACP states and replace 
the EU’s non-reciprocal trade preferences. In that 
context, the negotiations were sure to attract great 
attention. They were accompanied by intense discus-
sions in the European Union’s General Affairs and 
External Relations Council and in Caribbean and Euro-
pean civil society. Although the Caribbean partners 
are not economically weighty, the European Union 
does possess geopolitical interests in the Caribbean. 
Intense efforts to produce a new approach contrib-
uting to sustainable development have created a free 
trade agreement that can justifiably claim model 
character. Asymmetrical liberalisation takes account 
of the unequal economic starting points of the part-
ners, with the European Union granting the Caribbean 
states completely free market access. Sustainability 
and development are cross-cutting issues, as is re-
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6 
gional integration. All the components of the agree-
ment are designed to contribute to these goals: moni-
toring mechanisms detect problems at an early stage, 
while safeguards and flexibilities permit the Carib-
bean states to respond using policy measures. The 
development instruments applied to support nego-
tiations and implementation continue to generate 
opportunities to tackle capacity bottlenecks in the 
region and thus improve the prospects of realisation 
of the agreement’s ambitious objectives. One impor-
tant factor behind the success of the EPA was CARI-
FORUM’s committed and visionary negotiating team, 
which conducted detailed analyses of the region’s 
interests, defined regional policy goals on the basis of 
wide-ranging discussion processes in the participating 
countries, and represented these effectively in the 
talks with the European Union. 
Yet even if the CARIFORUM EPA (C-EPA) possesses 
great potential, this alone cannot guarantee positive 
outcomes. For example, to date the Caribbean part-
ners have enjoyed only limited success in realising 
additional export opportunities. The experience with 
the C-EPA underlines yet again the importance of 
circumstances, especially internal reforms, for success 
in foreign trade. The economic and financial crisis 
that broke out shortly after the agreement was con-
cluded hit most Caribbean economies hard, and with-
out a doubt overshadowed positive effects of the EPA. 
But internal problems also bear some responsibility 
for the failure of the CARIFORUM countries to open up 
substantial new export perspectives despite now 
enjoying free market access. Concretely, the most im-
portant would be expensive production inputs, high 
transaction costs, capacity problems in administration 
and the private sector (as well as civil society), and 
foot-dragging on regional integration. Furthermore, 
gaining entry to the highly complex and geographical-
ly distant European market, with its complex tech-
nical standards and administrative hurdles, is not easy 
at the best of times. The common European market 
eases access in certain respects for goods, but to a 
much lesser extent for services, which is where the 
Caribbean hopes to exploit particular advantages. 
It remains to be seen whether the ambitious goals 
of the agreement can be achieved and the C-EPA as a 
whole becomes a success. The system for monitoring 
whether reforms and liberalisation contribute to sus-
tainable development has yet to be finalised. And if 
problematic effects are detected, there still needs to be 
political will to use those instruments that do exist 
thoroughly enough to modify the implementation steps. 
A number of conclusions for the future of the C-EPA 
– and more broadly for development-promoting free 
trade agreements and the role of aid for trade – can be 
derived from the negotiating process that produced 
the C-EPA, from the structure of the agreement, and 
from its application in practice. Elements of the C-EPA 
can be used as a model for trade agreements of devel-
oping countries, the European Union and other indus-
trialised states. This applies in particular to asymmet-
rical trade liberalisation, preserving government poli-
cy space to safeguard social and ecological objectives, 
flexible safeguards, and introducing new issues with 
potential to boost sustainable development and re-
gional integration. Backing the process with aid for 
trade is an aspect of great importance, both for cover-
ing adjustment costs and for initiating processes and 
sharing lessons and experience. Germany should build 
on its standing as a reliable partner of the CARIFORUM 
region, which stems not least from its use of bilateral 
development funds to support implementation of the 
EPA. 
The research for this study included more than 
ninety interviews conducted in 2014 in Barbados, the 
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, 
St. Lucia, Germany and the European Commission. 
The interviewees included representatives of govern-
ment, civil society, academia and the private sector, 
as well as national, regional and international insti-
tutions and organisations. 
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The CARIFORUM-EU EPA: Securing Trade Preferences or 
Development through Value Creation? 
 
The Caribbean partners are small countries, almost all 
of them islands. The largest, the Dominican Republic, 
has a population of 10.4 million and a GDP of $ 61 bil-
lion; at the other end of the scale, St. Kitts and Nevis 
has just 54,190 inhabitants and a GDP of $ 766 mil-
lion.1 Correspondingly, the CARIFORUM states 
account for just 0.3 percent of EU external trade, with 
a total volume of € 11.3 billion in 2013. In other 
words, these are not significant trading partners.2 A 
number of EU member states possess direct invest-
ments, for example in the tourism, rum and beer 
sectors. The Caribbean states have not to date played a 
big role as economic partners for Germany. Trade 
statistics aside, this was also reflected in general lack 
of interest shown by German corporations and 
business organisations in dialogue with the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, 
which was responsible for the EPA talks. 
The Caribbean is, however, important to the Euro-
pean Union in geopolitical terms, as the immediate 
neighbourhood also contains French, British and 
Dutch overseas countries and territories. In other 
words, the European Union itself is in a sense part of 
the Caribbean.3 A specific article in the C-EPA (239) 
emphasises that cooperation in all areas of the agree-
ment is intended to strengthen economic and social 
relations between the outermost regions of the Euro-
pean Union and the CARIFORUM member states. Many 
interviewed stakeholders in the Caribbean stressed the 
particular interest in cooperation with Caribbean ter-
ritories of EU member states, which belong geographi-
cally to the region. 
Aside from their geopolitical importance, the Euro-
pean Union values the Caribbean countries as reliable 
partners who take an active and constructive role 
within the ACP. Not least, the region is courted inter-
 
1  World Bank, Data by Country (online), 
http://data.worldbank.org/country (accessed 27 May 2015). 
2  European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, 
European Union, Trade in Goods with ACP-Caribbean Countries, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ 
tradoc_113476.pdf (accessed 27 May 2015). 
3  Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the 
Joint Caribbean-EU Partnership Strategy, 3199th Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting (Brussels, 19 November 2012). 
nationally for its large number of votes at the United 
Nations. 
Under the UN classification the Caribbean states are 
middle-income countries, with the exception of Haiti, 
which is among the world’s poorest. The service sector 
is of considerable significance for the Caribbean island 
states, representing more than 80 percent of GDP in 
certain cases. The international financial and econom-
ic crisis hit the Caribbean economies hard, as reflected 
in the negative trends of elementary economic data. 
Thus in 2008/09 inward FDI in the CARICOM states fell 
by 44 percent, remittances by 7 percent, and export 
volume by 43 percent, whereby export revenues were 
further reduced by a drop of 40 percent in internation-
al commodity prices. The number of foreign tourists 
declined by 6 percent.4 These developments make it 
impossible to isolate the effects of the C-EPA, which 
came into effect at the same juncture. This is also 
acknowledged in the comprehensive review EPA 
implementation conducted in 2014 on behalf of the 
European Commission and the CARIFORUM secre-
tariat, by a team led by Ranjit H. Singh. The present 
study draws heavily on the findings of that report, but 
also contains an analysis of the C-EPA itself and con-
centrates first and foremost on evaluating free trade 
agreements with respect to their (expected) impacts 
and stated objectives. 
Provisions on Trade in Goods in the C-EPA 
The Economic Partnership Agreement places the Euro-
pean Union’s trade relations with its former colonies 
on a new footing in line with WTO rules. The European 
Union completely opened its market from 1 January 
2008, with transitional periods for rice (until 2009) 
and sugar (until 2015). This abolished numerous re-
strictions such as quotas and (sometimes seasonal) 
tariffs that still existed under the Lomé Conventions, 
 
4  Preeya Mohan and Patrick Kent Watson, The Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on CARICOM Countries (St. Augustine, Trinidad 
and Tobago: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute for Social and Econom-
ic Studies, University of the West Indies), 4, 
http://sta.uwi.edu/salises/pubs/documents/ 
TheImpactofFinancialCrisis.pdf (accessed 30 March 2015). 
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whose non-reciprocal trade preferences permitted the 
ACP states to export approximately 97 percent of their 
products to the European Union duty-free.5 Although 
the European Union’s exclusion of agricultural pro-
ducts was not protecting major market segments, this 
sector is of particular interest to developing countries. 
Potential Caribbean exports include dried bananas, 
confectionery, chocolate, fruit juice and pet food.6 
Free trade agreements contain rules of origin de-
signed to prevent goods from third countries being 
imported via one of the parties simply in order to 
exploit agreed preferences. In the C-EPA, the rules of 
origin have been loosened. In particular, the European 
Union agreed to abolish the so-called double trans-
formation in the textile and clothing sector, meaning 
that garments produced using fabric from third coun-
tries (for example in Latin America) may now be im-
ported duty-free into the European Union.7 The rules 
of origin in the agriculture and fisheries sectors have 
also been relaxed. A review of the rules of origin had 
been planned within five years of the EPA coming into 
effect, but this has yet to occur. Doing so would also 
offer an opportunity to update and modernise the 
rules along the same lines that the European Union 
has already applied in the scope of the Generalised 
System of Preferences.8 However, in toto, interview 
partners in the region believe that the simplification 
of rules of origin under the C-EPA is probably already 
making it easier for CARIFORUM countries to make 
use of trade preferences. 
Free trade areas create advantages for participating 
economies – to the detriment of third countries. Yet 
under particular conditions they may still represent a 
benefit to the international trade system. WTO rules 
therefore prescribe reciprocal liberalisation of “sub-
stantially all the trade” within a “reasonable length of 
time”. While this grants developing countries a certain 
degree of flexibility, the EPA also requires Caribbean 
 
5  Ursula Hönich, “Trade in Goods: Full Liberalization in the 
EU,” in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement: A 
Practitioners’ Analysis, ed. Americo Beviglia Zampetti and Junior 
Lodge (Alphen aan den Rijn, 2011), 43–54 (44). 
6  Sacha Silva, Caribbean Trade Integration after the West Indian 
Commission: A Time of Inaction? Final Draft, Prepared for 
Caribbean Exporters’ Colloquium, Hilton Barbados Resort, 
Bridgetown, Barbados, 20 to 21 March 2013. 
7  For a detailed description of the changes, see Stefano 
Inama, “Rules of Origin, Customs, and Trade Facilitation 
Issues”, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, 
ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see note 5), 83–100. 
8  Ibid., 100. 
partners to open their markets to the European Union 
to a certain extent. 
Under the C-EPA the Caribbean opens its markets 
to a considerably smaller extent than the European 
Union and with longer transitional periods; in other 
words, the reciprocal liberalisation is strongly asym-
metrical. The starting situation was that 51 percent of 
Caribbean imports from the European Union were 
tariff-free,9 after five years 57 percent will be, after ten 
years 61.1 percent, after fifteen years 82.7 percent and 
after twenty-five years 86.9 percent (90.2 percent of 
tariff lines).10 In particular, agricultural and fishery 
products are completely excluded from the market 
opening, along with certain industrial goods.11 At the 
end of this unusually long transition period, CARI-
FORUM will have lifted tariff restrictions on more than 
80 percent of its imports. That figure exceeds what 
Geneva insiders regard as the threshold for developing 
countries in a free trade area, namely an opening of 
70 percent over a period of fifteen to twenty years.12 
One Caribbean negotiator described how a fixation on 
the necessary minimum liberalisation (especially in 
traditionally protectionist Caribbean countries) had 
led to serious statistical problems and ultimately to 
imprecision in defining sensitive products,13 possibly 
because the discussion therefore concentrated more 
on statistical artefacts than real problems. 
The C-EPA is also asymmetrical within the CARI-
FORUM region. A large part of the liberalisation is 
borne by the Dominican Republic,14 95 percent of 
whose imports from the European Union will be tariff-
free.15 The Dominican Republic has thus granted EU
 
9  Ranjit H. Singh et al., Monitoring the Implementation and 
Results of the CARIFORUM–EU EPA Agreement (September 2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/ 
tradoc_152825.pdf (accessed 23 April 2015). 
10  European Commission, Information Paper CARIFORUM–EU 
Economic Partnership Agreement: An Overview (Brussels, July 2008). 
11  Sacha Silva, “‘Mix Up Matrimony’: Crafting a Common 
Caribbean Market Access Offer”, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement, ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see 
note 5), 55–72 (67). 
12  Sanoussi Bilal and Isabelle Ramdoo, Options to Address 
Contentious Issues in EPA Negotiations – A Question of Political Will, 
ECDPM Briefing Note 20 (Maastricht: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, November 2010). 
13  Silva, “‘Mix Up Matrimony’” (see note 11), 59. 
14  On relations between the Dominican Republic and 
CARICOM see the section on regional integration, pp. 17ff. 
15  Carl B. Greenidge, “Things Associated with EPA and its 
Predecessor”, speech to the Parliament of Guyana, 10 May 
2012. 
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Figure 1 
CARIFORUM exports to the EU by product group, 1995–2013 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTADstat (online), 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportfolders.aspx (accessed 27 January 2015). 
 
exporters similarly sweeping market access to that 
granted to US businesses under the Dominican Repub-
lic–United States–Central America Free Trade Agree-
ment. This permitted the CARICOM countries to make 
correspondingly smaller concessions under the C-EPA. 
Reservations on the part of smaller CARICOM states 
are the principal reason for market access granted to 
the European Union being often less comprehensive 
than that granted to the United States.16 This construc-
tion also offers advantages for the Dominican Repub-
lic: Having negotiated the EPA jointly with CARICOM, 
it was able to secure EU trade preferences without 
conceding full parity with the United States. This was 
regarded as helpful given its differential sensitivities 
vis-à-vis the two trade blocs. At the same time, the 
C-EPA also improves market access between CARI-
FORUM states.17 
 
 
 
16  Richard L. Bernal, “The Challenge of Sustainable Imple-
mentation”, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agree-
ment, ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see note 5), 239–60 
(258). 
17  See the section on regional integration, pp. 17ff. 
EU–CARIFORUM Trade Trends 
The value of goods exported from the CARIFORUM 
region to the European Union increased from $ 3.6 bil-
lion in 2005 to $ 4.5 billion in 2013. But the structure 
has changed little over the past two decades (see Fig-
ure 1). The proportion of finished products has fluc-
tuated, the share of mineral fuels increased, but there 
has been no significant diversifying shift towards 
manufactured goods. The European Union’s market 
importance has declined, with its share of CARIFORUM 
exports falling from 19.5 percent (1995) to 14.4 per-
cent by 2013, while the relevance of other regions in-
creased.18 The European Union’s non-reciprocal trade 
preferences agreed in the Lomé Conventions were un-
able to stem that trend.19 This shows that a country’s 
 
18  Own calculations using data from United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTADstat, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/ 
reportfolders.aspx (accessed 27 January 2015). 
19  The European Union’s significance as a source of develop-
ment funding has also declined. In recent years Venezuela 
has been the most important donor in the Caribbean in the 
form of discounted oil supplies under the PetroCaribe pro-
gramme; Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Development Paths in the Caribbean (New 
York, December 2012), 36. 
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export development depends not only on the tariffs 
involved, but also on many other factors such as in-
ternal reforms and global economic influences. Ser-
vices, on the other hand, have grown in importance. 
Nor has any notable change in the export structure 
been seen since the C-EPA came into effect in 2008. 
According to the comprehensive analysis of the effects 
of the agreement by Singh and colleagues, no clear 
connection can be observed between market opening 
and the development of trade flows since 2008. Al-
though it was possible to tie particular increases to the 
European Union’s broader market opening, especially 
concerning the Dominican Republic (tobacco, cloth-
ing), export growth was mostly based on other factors. 
The global financial and economic crisis had a strong-
ly negative influence, with the exception of increasing 
exports from Trinidad and Tobago (energy) and the 
Dominican Republic. In the case of the Dominican 
Republic it was above all the Dominican Republic–
United States–Central America Free Trade Agreement 
that boosted growth and persuaded the government 
to create conditions designed to diversify exports to 
countries other than the United States. 
As far as Caribbean imports from the European 
Union are concerned, the picture is similar. The stron-
gest growth was in agricultural products, which were 
either already tariff-free or excluded from liberalisa-
tion. Imports into the Dominican Republic of certain 
products liberalised since 2008, which serve as inputs 
into manufacturing have also increased strongly on 
the basis of that country’s positive economic growth. 
But for certain unliberalised products even higher 
growth has been recorded.20 Similar trends are ob-
served in the CARICOM countries, with the exception 
of Suriname, which maintains especially close ties 
with the Netherlands and imports more goods liber-
alised under the EPA. It thus transpires that on the 
import side, too, other factors than EPA-driven market 
opening play a considerably more important role: 
namely, the global economic crisis, national policies 
and major public contracts. Of course new market 
opportunities have been grasped in individual cases, 
either in the form of exports, or of inputs imported for 
domestic industrial production. Fears that EPA liberal-
isation could lead to a displacement of Caribbean pro-
duction by European competitors have to date proved 
unfounded. 
 
20  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 76ff. 
Export Success Factors 
The relatively small detectable effects of the C-EPA on 
European-Caribbean trade give rise to a fundamental 
question: what contribution can a free trade agree-
ment actually make to increasing exports? Numerous 
other factors also influence competitiveness, and thus 
a country’s export chances. With respect to the Carib-
bean, scientific reports and some of the interviewed 
stakeholders point to the particular importance of the 
following elements: 
Availability of elementary production inputs at attractive 
prices. Inputs such as telecommunications and electric-
ity are frequently very expensive, because long-term 
monopoly arrangements with regional providers in 
certain countries exclude competition and secure high 
monopoly rents for privileged operators (which are in 
turn often intimately bound up with the traditional 
elites). The neglect of agriculture observed in certain 
CARICOM states also sometimes leads to additional 
imports being required even where food producers 
would prefer to source local products. Some of those 
interviewed also pointed out that tariffs are some-
times imposed on production inputs that are practi-
cally unavailable in the region, making the produc-
tion of certain products (such as sauces using imported 
spices) unnecessarily difficult and expensive. Several 
rum producers pointed out that transport and logis-
tics costs made it important to be able to rely on local 
cane sugar production, where the available quantities 
had fallen. Some of the countries concerned suffer a 
lack of (also skilled) labour in agriculture, industry, 
and also the service sector. In this connection criticism 
was expressed that regional integration was not yet 
permitting significant labour mobility. 
High transport and transaction costs on account of the 
small size of the islands and the modest production 
volumes involved. Export potential is also determined 
by logistics factors, where the question of whether a 
quantity of freight is large enough to load a container, 
or at least a pallet, may be decisive. Supplying local 
hotels also demands both a high standard of quality 
and the capacity to supply relatively large volumes 
reliably. 
Quality infrastructure – technical barriers to trade – sani-
tary and phytosanitary standards (SPS). The national quali-
ty infrastructure institutions in many Caribbean coun-
tries are inadequately equipped – where they exist at 
all. Only three countries possess a national accredita-
tion body: Jamaica, whose agency has already gained 
international recognition, and Trinidad and Tobago 
Export Success Factors 
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and the Dominican Republic, whose accreditation 
bodies are still in the process of being set up. And that 
means that almost all export-related questions have to 
be taken to quality infrastructure institutions outside 
the region, adding to the costs of exporting. For ex-
ample, in 2013 Trinidad and Tobago blocked imports 
of dairy products from Barbados on the grounds of 
inadequate observance of technical standards. At least 
as important as statutory standards are the private-
sector codes enforced by major food retailers, which 
are as a rule even more exacting in terms of product 
and process.21 
Administrative trade barriers include food labelling 
regulations, which differ not only between the Euro-
pean Union and the United States but also between 
different EU countries. Interviewees singled out the 
German recycling system for its extremely protection-
ist effects, with the returnable deposit system repre-
senting an additional obstacle to beverage exports. 
Difficulties such as language barriers and ignorance 
about responsible institutions present almost insur-
mountable obstacles to market access, especially for 
small exporters. For example, only six printers are 
authorised to print the German recycling logo on 
packaging. Locating one of them may represent quite 
a challenge to a foreign exporter. 
Lack of market knowledge including cultural and language 
barriers. Successful exporters generally work with an 
agent in the target country, who handles negotiations 
and logistics.22 Service exports, moreover, will usually 
involve personal acquaintance and at least the rudi-
ments of a relationship of trust. Where these factors 
are lacking, initiating new business relationships will 
be a particularly tough. In the service sector there is 
an additional problem of market exploration being 
dependent on the practice of visa issuance. 
Problems accessing export credit, or complete lack thereof. 
Trade financing is an important instrument for bridg-
ing the high costs involved in opening up a market, 
especially because settlement by major retail chains is 
often associated with long delays: namely, following 
 
21  Many interviewees mentioned that private standards were 
a matter of growing concern for Caribbean businesses; for 
example, the Global G.A.P. Standards for pesticides on 
bananas had negatively affected the region’s exports. 
22  BKP Development Research & Consulting, Identification and 
Assessment of the Underlying Reasons Affecting CARICOM’S Trade 
Performance under the Existing Bilateral Trade Agreements with the 
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela, 
Final Report, 12 March 2014, viii. Interviewees confirmed the 
importance of such trust-based partnerships. 
receipt of goods. Experts regard applying for funds for 
example from the Caribbean Export Development 
Agency, as administratively time-consuming and 
bureaucratic.23 
Small countries and lack of local and regional value chains, 
both of which impact negatively on economies of 
scale. Access to European food markets is controlled 
almost exclusively by supermarket chains, which are 
slow to accept new products and usually demand a 
constant supply of relatively large quantities. This 
makes entering the market fundamentally difficult for 
small producers. 
Reputation. Given that small suppliers are more 
dependent on a reputation for reliability, Caribbean 
deficits in this area represent a problem, as one ex-
ample described by a stakeholder illustrates. A caterer 
for an international airline had decided to purchase 
agricultural products in the Caribbean. But contrary 
to the terms of contract, the farmer failed to package 
the product and demanded a higher price – because 
the putative transaction had caused local prices to rise 
and the terms of the contract no longer appeared 
attractive. The deal fell through. The interviewee 
emphasised that where such small quantities were in-
volved importers saw no reason to “put up with such 
trouble”. 
Established trade flows hinder new market relationships. 
Old trade flows frequently persist even where better 
alternatives become available. Thus Guyana main-
tained its traditional bulk sugar exports to the United 
Kingdom and refrained from terminating the existing 
contract, even after the European Union funded a 
packaging plant as compensation for the expiry of the 
sugar protocol, which would have permitted greater 
domestic value creation. 
Positive contribution of foreign domestic investment. 
European investment in the rum industry and in 
Guyanese shrimp processing contributed to increasing 
exports.24 But interview partners from various fields 
shared the opinion that local and regional Caribbean 
businesses were frequently uninterested in opening 
up new markets, or at best only in their region. 
Aid for trade and EU cooperation with Caribbean institu-
tions play a positive role in promoting exports. The 
strong increase in rum exports from the Caribbean 
region, for example, stems from a drive to create a 
high-quality brand product that was supported by the 
 
23  Ibid. 
24  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 92. 
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European Union through aid for trade.25 Interview 
partners also named other comparable projects (such 
as sauce export from St. Lucia in the scope of the GIZ 
programme for EPA implementation). One result of a 
successful institutional cooperation between the Euro-
pean Commission and the agriculture ministry of the 
Dominican Republic has been to reduce the rejection 
rate of oriental vegetables, which had previously found 
it hard to satisfy the SPS standards in the European 
Union.26 
International conditions. The global economic and 
financial crisis had substantial negative effects, but 
trade flows are naturally affected by other policy fields 
too. Examples include: 
a) Market distortion through subsidies, including not 
only the consequences of the agricultural policies 
of the industrialised countries, but also negative 
effects of interventions such as US support for rum 
production in Puerto Rico. 
b) The unequal negotiating power of states in the 
international system. For example although Anti-
gua and Barbuda won its WTO case over internet 
gambling, the United States refuses to implement 
the ruling and the country is too small to assert its 
rights through countervailing measures.27 
 
 
25  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO), Caribbean Rum 
Sector Programme, Aid-for-Trade Case Story: Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) (Geneva, 2011). The rum sector was an obvious 
target for such support, because of its traditionally economic 
importance for Caribbean employment and GDP, via cane 
sugar production. 
26  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 92. 
27  Claude Robinson, “US–Antigua Trade Dispute Exposes 
Global Inequity”, Jamaica Observer (online), 24 February 2013. 
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The C-EPA as “Deep” Free Trade Agreement 
 
Services and Cultural Cooperation 
The CARIFORUM EPA contains wide-ranging provi-
sions concerning the service sector, which is of great 
economic importance in the Caribbean. In many of 
these countries tourism, especially, contributes more 
than 50 percent of GDP and employment,28 but is sub-
ject to strong cyclical fluctuation. The global recession 
of 2007 revealed how vulnerable the sector is to ex-
ternal shocks. In this situation the CARIFORUM states 
were very interested in including services in the EPA.29 
The chapter on services includes all the so-called 
modes of supply (WTO classification) and numerous 
sectors. It is peppered with statements on the role of 
development cooperation and its contribution to sup-
porting Caribbean exports and institutions, but with-
out any specific detail on how such promotion is to 
be funded. 
In the field of services, the C-EPA again provides for 
asymmetrical liberalisation. The European Union has 
opened up 94 percent of sectors, the middle-income 
CARICOM countries 75 percent, the CARICOM LDCs 
65 percent, and the Dominican Republic 90 percent.30 
In the “commercial presence” (direct investment) and 
“cross-border supply of services” modes, however, the 
text merely replicates the status quo.31 The chapter on 
financial services goes slightly further than GATS.32 All 
in all, for the CARIFORUM countries the EPA largely 
confirms a pre-existing openness in the service sector.33 
 
28  Caribbean Community Secretariat, Caribbean Community 
Regional Aid for Trade Strategy 2013–2015 (Georgetown, Guyana, 
February 2013), 31. 
29  Errol Humphrey, CARIFORUM EPA Negotiations: Initial Reflec-
tions on the Outcome, presentation to a DG Trade-organised work-
shop on the CARIFORUM-EC EPA, Brussels, 13 February 2008. 
30  Allyson Francis and Heidi Ullrich, “Analysis of Economic 
Partnership Agreements: Trade in Services, Case Study of the 
CARIFORUM-EU Agreement”, in How to Ensure Development 
Friendly Economic Partnership Agreements – Lessons across Regions, 
ed. Regine Qualmann (Eschborn, 2009), 69. 
31  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 43f. 
32  Francis and Ullrich, “Analysis” (see note 30), 74. 
33  Andrew Lang and Caitlin Conyers, Financial Services in EU 
Trade Agreements, Study for the ECON Committee, European 
Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department A, IP/A/ECON/2014-08 (Brussels, November 2014), 
10, 27. 
In certain very specific areas the European Union 
has liberalised its market further than the multilateral 
framework (GATS), specifically opening the EU tourism 
sector to travel agencies, tour operators and tourist 
guides from the CARIFORUM states.34 CARIFORUM 
claimed in particular the agreements on temporary 
supply of services by natural persons as a great success. 
The EU has opened its market, subject to certain con-
ditions, to suppliers of selected services (for twenty-
nine categories of contractual service provider for up 
to six months or one year, as well as for eleven cate-
gories of independent professional, including chefs, 
models, musicians, authors, artists and performers).35 
Article 85 of the EPA encourages professional organi-
sations to prepare recommendations for mutual recog-
nition of qualifications and to commence negotiations 
on the issue within three years. A memorandum of 
understanding has now been signed between the 
Architects’ Council of Europe and the architects of the 
CARIFORUM states, represented by three regional orga-
nisations, also with support through aid for trade.36 
The Caribbean organisations for engineers and ac-
countants are currently still discussing harmonisation 
and mutual recognition of professional qualifications 
amongst themselves, before commencing negotiations 
with their EU counterparts. 
The EPA’s passages on services also contain numer-
ous references to aid for trade, for example in relation 
to technology transfer and information exchange. 
Many of the measures mentioned have been imple-
mented since the agreement came into force.37 
The field of cultural cooperation has its own proto-
col (III) in the C-EPA, where the partners have insti-
tuted a very innovative agreement and for the first 
time implemented the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions of 20 October 2005, whose Article 16 pro-
vides for preferential treatment of developing coun-
 
34  Francis and Ullrich, “Analysis” (see note 30), 74. 
35  Silva, Caribbean Trade Integration after the West Indian 
Commission (see note 6). 
36  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 49. 
37  According to Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), more 
than five hundred businesses have participated in various 
programmes for the service sector. 
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tries. The protocol addresses the topics of exchange, 
training and cooperation, grants Caribbean artists and 
performers preferential temporary market access (see 
above), and institutes preferential treatment of audio-
visual and cinematographic products via a definition 
of origin. Treating joint EU-CARIFORUM productions 
as “European works” within the European Union 
means not only that they are categorised as “Europe-
an” in broadcasting quotas, but also that they enjoy 
access to European subsidies. Under this arrangement, 
the Caribbean partner is supposed to contribute be-
tween 20 and 80 percent of the film’s budget (Proto-
col III, Art. 5). A project to increase exports in the 
service sector funded by the Caribbean Development 
Bank (CDB) has already generated at least one film 
cooperation between Trinidad and Tobago and the 
French overseas department of Martinique, where a 
contract has already been signed. 
Caribbean stakeholders attribute great importance 
to the protocol on cultural cooperation.38 On the one 
hand, the region hopes to build on the opportunities 
generated by the positive connotations of Caribbean 
art and culture in Europe (music, fashion, film). On 
the other, competition in the creative sector is largely 
independent of considerations of price, while the very 
high costs of production inputs in the Caribbean are 
of less relevance in this sector. Nonetheless, it will be 
no easy matter to realise the economic potential 
attributed to the Caribbean culture industry. Its main 
problems are that political leaders often fail to recog-
nise it as a serious economic factor, that those work-
ing in the sector have virtually no professional repre-
sentation, and that there is no sectoral statistical data. 
The upshot is a neglect of culture in political decision-
making.39 One illustration of this was related by an 
interviewee: a prime minister had spoken disparag-
ingly of an ensemble from his country as a “bunch of 
musicians”, only to learn that an international tour by 
the group had generated more foreign currency than 
the nation’s sugar exports. The culture ministry of 
Trinidad and Tobago has established a register of art-
ists and performers to facilitate more active inter-
vention in this sector. 
With respect to the actual development of trade in 
services, the picture is similar to trade in goods. Be-
 
38  For further details, see: Keith Nurse, “The Economic Part-
nership Agreement and the Creative Sector: Implications and 
Prospects for CARIFORUM”, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement, ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see 
note 5), 147–62. 
39  Ibid., 160. 
tween 2000 and 2008 CARIFORUM exports increased 
in central fields such as personal and cultural services 
and licensing revenues. The global recession then 
caused a decline until 2010, with a recovery occurring 
since.40 While it cannot be proven that new trade flows 
have been generated explicitly by the C-EPA, investors 
see the agreement as a positive signal. A significant 
increase in investment has been registered in the 
Dominican Republic.41 
Even if the chances offered by the EPA in the fields 
of services and cultural cooperation are highly valued 
in the Caribbean, there is a certain sense of disenchant-
ment in view of the practical obstacles that continue 
to hinder market access. These include economic needs 
tests, contract requirements, professional experience 
requirements, and rules on duration of activity. Carib-
bean interview partners often pointed to the problems 
caused by very restrictive visa regulations, not only for 
service providers but also for other businesspeople 
wishing to explore markets. In some respects the EU 
member states appear to be in contravention at least 
of the spirit of the EPA here, if not also the letter,42 
sometimes probably simply through ignorance of the 
relevant CARIFORUM EPA rules in the agencies respon-
sible for issuing visas. But it is in the service sector – 
that depends much more strongly on trust and per-
sonal contact than trade in goods, where a potential 
importer can examine a product – that the issue hits 
hardest. For example, the C-EPA opens up the Euro-
pean market for chef de cuisine services, but makes 
entry conditional upon already having a job within 
the European Union. Development cooperation can 
play an important role in bringing together suppliers 
and customers. It is likely to be especially difficult to 
overcome the information deficit concerning the EPA 
in the creative industries, where micro-businesses 
frequently exhibit a tendency to “avoid structures”,43 
making it very difficult to target them with informa-
tion about the opportunities offered by the EPA. Here 
too, fundamentally, the chances offered by the agree-
ment will remain fallow until individuals and institu-
tions take up the issues and create forums for Euro-
pean-Caribbean cooperation. 
 
40  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 102. 
41  Ibid. 
42  See examples in Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 47. 
43  Errol Humphrey, Implementing the Economic Partnership 
Agreement: Challenges and Bottlenecks in the CARIFORUM Region, 
ECDPM Discussion Paper 117 (Maastricht: ECDPM, June 2011), 
5. 
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New Topics, Internal Reforms and 
Sustainability 
As tariffs have fallen and lost their influence on inter-
national trade flows, other factors such as non-tariff 
and regulatory trade barriers have grown in impor-
tance. This is reflected not only in an expansion of the 
regulatory scope of the WTO and free trade agreements 
over the past twenty years, but also in economic re-
search. New trade theory underlines the importance 
of transaction costs for export success.44 Investment, 
public procurement, competition law and trade facili-
tation may be of great importance under the aspect of 
efficiency of state action and lowering transaction 
costs. Empirical research conducted in recent years 
has also demonstrated that trade liberalisation is most 
likely to lead to positive growth effects where it is 
associated with other reforms and measures such as 
investment in human capital, deepening financial 
markets, improvements to public infrastructure, a 
policy of lowering inflation,45 and regulation of busi-
ness and labour.46 The British development economist 
Oliver Morrissey emphasises the general relevance of 
regulatory reform and strengthening institutions for 
lowering transaction costs.47 His German colleague 
Matthias Busse also underlines the significance of 
competition policy,48 which he argues is a precondi-
tion for consumers to benefit from price reductions. 
In the EPA talks the negotiators from the Caribbean 
Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which the 
CARIFORUM states set up to negotiate collective free 
trade agreements, pushed hard for the inclusion of 
“new topics”, in the sense of “WTO+” issues. And 
numerous new topics are indeed addressed in the 
 
44  Evita Schmieg, Theorie der Regionalen Integration – die EU und 
die Karibik, Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 2006. 
45  Roberto Chang, Linda Kaltani and Norman V. Loayza, 
“Openness Can Be Good for Growth: The Role of Policy Com-
plementarities”, Journal of Development Economics 90 (2009):  
33–49. 
46  Caroline Freund and Bineswaree Bolaky, “Trade, Regula-
tions, and Income”, Journal of Development Economics 87 (2008): 
309–21. 
47  Oliver Morrissey, “Conclusions: EPAs to Promote ACP 
Development”, in Assessing Prospective Trade Policy, ed. Oliver 
Morrissey (Abingdon, 2011), 223–34. 
48  Matthias Busse, “Revisiting the ACP-EU Economic Partner-
ship Agreements – The Role of Complementary Trade and 
Investment Policies”, Intereconomics 45, no. 4 (2010): 249–54. 
Busse concludes that a particular level must be reached be-
fore trade liberalisation can promote development, and that 
liberalisation measures should be tied to progress on particu-
lar indicators. 
agreement, although few legally enforceable obliga-
tions are defined (example are found in the areas of 
SPS, TBT, environment). In most cases statements are 
restricted to a deepening of information exchange and 
technology transfer, and development cooperation in 
general. CARIFORUM agreed to binding obligations on 
protection of intellectual property, including in rela-
tion to geographical indications. This was an impor-
tant issue for the European Union (although implemen-
tation of this provision has yet to begin and is tied to 
development support). 
Aspects of sustainability are comparatively firmly 
anchored in the C-EPA. Article 3 (“Sustainable develop-
ment”) contains a commitment that “the application 
of this Agreement shall fully take into account the 
human, cultural, economic, social, health and environ-
mental best interests of their respective population 
and of future generations”. Here the parties underline 
the equal status of the three dimensions of sustain-
ability: economic, social and environmental. This for-
mulation represents an important point of reference 
for implementing the agreement and for handling 
disagreements that may arise. A “single focus on 
economic elements”, of the kind found in traditional 
free trade agreements that pursue only the restricted 
objective of trade liberalisation “is no longer accept-
able”.49 The C-EPA contains provisions aiming directly 
at the introduction and observance of particular social 
and environmental standards. It also includes a com-
mitment to the ILO’s core labour standards, whose 
observation is to be backed up and verified by a con-
sultation mechanism. The agreement dedicates an 
entire chapter to environmental issues, and explicitly 
recognises the parties’ right to regulation. The environ-
ment chapter also refers to the need for a monitoring 
mechanism. 
The impact of a free trade agreement naturally 
ensues very largely from its economic provisions. It is 
thus all the more important that the fundamental 
thrust of the CARIFORUM EPA serve sustainable devel-
opment in the partner countries. This is clearly re-
flected in a series of elements within the agreement, 
where asymmetrical market opening takes account of 
the unequal starting conditions. A flexible, one-sided 
safeguard clause (Art. 25) permits the reintroduction 
of tariffs in the event of problematic increases in im-
 
49  Americo Beviglia Zampetti, “Environment, Social Aspects 
and Institutional Provisions”, in The CARIFORUM-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement, ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see 
note 5), 179–98 (192). 
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ports. And governments are explicitly granted leeway 
to tighten laws and standards (Art. 191). Article 27 (4) 
provides an exception from the national treatment 
principle, by permitting subsidies to be paid exclusive-
ly to domestic producers and thus keeping open the 
possibility to pursue national economic policy goals. 
In the sphere of investment, the EPA applies a very 
innovative approach. Without additionally widening 
market access in the field of investment, several arti-
cles (Art. 72 [d], Art. 73, similarly Art. 193, Art. 188) 
oblige investors to observe sustainability.50 Overall, 
the CARIFORUM EPA thus demonstrates as yet 
untested ways to address “new topics” in free trade 
agreements. 
 
 
50  For further detail, see: Evita Schmieg, Human Rights and 
Sustainability in Free Trade Agreements: Can the Cariforum-EU Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement Serve as a Model? SWP Comment 
24/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 
2014). 
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Regional Integration and EPA – Foundation or Contradiction? 
 
According to classical trade theory, regional integra-
tion is advantageous for a country when more new 
trade is generated than is diverted from third coun-
tries to regional partners; in other words, where – 
using the model of the Canadian free trade theorist 
Jacob Viner – trade creation is greater than trade diver-
sion. In view of its historically low intensity of trade, 
the preconditions in the Caribbean are limited, even if 
intra-regional trade between CARIFORUM states has 
increased from 9.7 percent (1995) to 17.3 percent 
(2013).51 Furthermore, most of the internal trade is 
conducted between a handful of countries: Jamaica is 
the biggest importer within CARICOM with approxi-
mately one third of intra-regional trade; Trinidad and 
Tobago accounts for more than half of the region’s 
exports (largely oil and oil products).52 The spatial 
approaches of new trade theory point to additional 
arguments for regional integration and underline the 
superiority of reciprocal market access over one-sided 
trade liberalisation. The principal difference to clas-
sical theory is the abandonment of unrealistic model-
ling assumptions. The new models acknowledge the 
existence of economies of scale and transaction costs, 
permit product differentiation, and recognise that 
countries differ in their starting situation and geo-
graphical position.53 
Institutional Aspects and Anchoring of 
Regional Integration in the EPA 
Regional integration is not as a rule a purely economic 
project, but also a political one reflecting historical 
and cultural commonalities. In 1973 Caribbean states 
formed the Caribbean Common Market; the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy (CSME) came into force in 
2006 (without the Bahamas). But implementation of 
obligations ensuing from the decision to set up the 
CSME has been slow. By 2012, 64 percent of its provi-
sions had been implemented (80 percent for goods, 
 
51  Own calculations using data from UNCTADstat (see note 
18). 
52  Ibid. 
53  Schmieg, Theorie (see note 44). 
fewer in the fields of services and mobility of capital 
and labour).54 
The Spanish-speaking Dominican Republic is only 
associated with CARICOM through a free trade agree-
ment signed in 1998, which the interviewed stake-
holders in the region regarded as relatively unambi-
tious because it covers just a small proportion of trade 
and has been implemented only slowly. Moreover, the 
further-going negotiations that had originally been 
planned on the topics of services, investment, public 
procurement and protection of intellectual property 
were not in fact pursued.55 Growth in trade attribut-
able to the agreement has to date been observed prin-
cipally between Trinidad and Tobago and the Domini-
can Republic. 
A regular cooperation between CARICOM and the 
Dominican Republic has existed since 1992 through 
the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM). The trigger for 
this came from the European Union, which made 
access to regional funding from the European Devel-
opment Fund (EDF) conditional upon such coopera-
tion. In the course of its efforts to support regional 
integration processes in the ACP states, the European 
Union had provided corresponding funds, including 
wide-ranging assistance for the private sector, chan-
nelled through the Caribbean Export Development 
Agency. It is thus development instruments that have 
over the past twenty years supplied the structure for 
regular dialogue and cooperation between CARICOM 
and the Dominican Republic. This cooperation forms 
the political basis for the free trade agreement be-
tween the Caribbean Community and the Dominican 
Republic. At the same time, CARIFORUM already 
supplied a framework for the Caribbean region’s joint 
negotiations with the European Union over the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement. 
 
54  Larry Placide, cited in Raphael John-Lall, “Trade Consul-
tant: T&T Is Caricom’s Most Open Economy”, Trinidad and 
Tobago Guardian (online), 2 February 2012, 
http://m.guardian.co.tt/business-guardian/2012-02-01/trade-
consultant-tt-caricom%E2%80%99s-most-open-economy 
(accessed 8 May 2015). 
55  Cf. Junior Lodge, “A Trade Partnership for Sustainable 
Development”, in: The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement, ed. Beviglia Zampetti and Lodge (see note 5), 19–42. 
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These talks were entrusted to the Caribbean Region-
al Negotiating Machinery, which had been founded in 
1997 to represent CARIFORUM in negotiations with 
the United States about a Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas and with the European Union about the EPA. The 
CRNM was an autonomous body of experts answerable 
directly to the heads of government. The construction 
reflected the high standing and great trust enjoyed by 
its first director-general, Sir Shridath Ramphal, among 
CARIFORUM members. To this day, the erstwhile mem-
bers of the CRNM are highly respected as exceptionally 
qualified and committed figures with a vision for the 
region’s future. But the governance structure of the 
CRNM limited its mandate. Even minor alterations to 
the CARIFORUM market access position, for example, 
had to be approved at the highest level.56 The Euro-
pean Commission, on the other hand, was in quite a 
different position. As always in foreign trade negotia-
tions, it was acting autonomously in the scope of a 
very broadly framed mandate and had only to consult 
the member states over fundamental departures. The 
CRNM, for its part, found itself negotiating in two 
directions: with the European Commission, and with 
its own regional heads of government, who had to be 
informed in detail about progress and needed con-
vincing of the positions the CRNM intended to take. 
Members of government and former negotiators re-
ported that the greatest challenge in the EPA talks had 
been intra-regional coordination, where governments 
in turn had to consult continuously with represen-
tatives of business and civil society to define their 
respective national negotiating positions. In this pro-
cess they were supported by the CRNM, as especially in 
the smaller Caribbean states administrative capacities 
were very thin. Frequently just one single civil servant 
was responsible for all questions of market access, and 
sometimes the same person handled all questions 
relating to foreign trade.57 Today outside observers 
and all involved regard the work of the CRNM as ex-
tremely successful, especially with respect to asserting 
Caribbean interests in the EPA with the European 
Union. 
The CRNM saw the EPA talks as an opportunity to 
inject more dynamism into the sluggish progress of 
regional integration.58 Here it was of central impor-
 
56  Silva, “’Mix Up Matrimony’” (see note 11), 62. 
57  Ibid. 
58  Federico Alberto Cuello Camilo, “Realizing the Cotonou 
Blueprint through a Development-Enhancing Agreement”, in: 
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, ed. Beviglia 
Zampetti and Lodge (see note 5), 11–18 (17). 
tance to preserve influence over the integration pro-
cess and not to prejudice it through the talks.59 This 
premise is visible at many points within the C-EPA: 
Article 1 names regional integration as one of the 
goals of the agreement; Article 4, which is dedicated 
specifically to the topic, begins with an affirmation of 
the importance of the process for the success of the 
EPA, but notes in paragraph 4 that “the pace and con-
tent of regional integration are matters to be deter-
mined exclusively by the CARIFORUM States”. The rest 
of the agreement also contains many references to the 
objective of promoting regional integration. 
Regional Preference in the EPA and 
Problems of Implementation 
An absolutely central role in strengthening the re-
gional integration process is played by Article 238, 
the regional preference clause, which states that any 
liberalisation towards the European Union must also 
apply between the CARIFORUM states. From the devel-
opment perspective this is a minimum demand that 
avoids tariff reductions towards the European Union 
discriminating against partners in the region and 
diverting trade to the European Union.60 The regional 
preference clause is de facto associated with addition-
al liberalisation in the region, for the following three 
reasons: 
 In certain respects, the C-EPA demands a further-
reaching market opening than the CARICOM-
Dominican Republic free trade agreement, includ-
ing in services; 
 The EPA for the first time draws the members of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 
which possess LDC status within CARICOM, into 
reciprocity, and demands a certain degree of mar-
ket opening on their part too; 
 The EPA includes the Bahamas in liberalisation for 
the first time. CRNM negotiator Junior Lodge points 
out that although the Bahamas is under no obliga-
tion to immediately apply the joint CARICOM ex-
ternal tariff, increasing intra-regional trade funda- 
 
 
59  Lodge, “A Trade Partnership” (see note 55), 33. 
60  Schmieg, Theorie (see note 44), makes the more incisive 
proposal of defining an internal margin of preference: where 
negotiations with a third country or entity (such as the Euro-
pean Union) produced an outcome below the existing inter-
nal tariff (for example CARICOM) a further liberalisation 
within the free trade area would automatically follow. 
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mentally makes membership of the CSME increas-
ingly attractive.61 
Out of concern over possible consequences of 
regional market opening, above all with respect to 
imports from the Dominican Republic, which is re-
garded as more competitive, but to a lesser extent also 
from Trinidad and Tobago, the regional preference 
clause has yet to be implemented. This was addressed 
and discussed in December 2014 in the Trade and 
Development Committee, a monitoring body consti-
tuted under Article 230, but a solution has yet to be 
found. 
Reservations against internal market opening are 
rooted in various concerns. Many countries, especially 
among the OECS states, already see themselves as 
insufficiently competitive to survive free trade in the 
CARICOM framework.62 Interviews with private sector 
representatives, government officials and researchers 
revealed that there is the considerably less fear of 
competition from the European Union, which is much 
further away and less present in the market. This 
stance already represents a drag on internal CARICOM 
integration: where consensus decisions are required, 
the slowest sets the pace. Trinidad and Tobago and the 
Dominican Republic, on the other hand, regard liber-
alisation as an instrument for increasing competitive-
ness – an aspect that came up repeatedly in stake-
holder interviews. Trinidad and Tobago has therefore 
applied for a partial suspension of the CARICOM ex-
ternal tariff, in order to be able to liberalise more 
strongly under the EPA and bilateral free trade agree-
ments.63 
Another reason for the halting reduction of tariffs 
within the region is concern over loss of customs 
revenues,64 even if these exceed 1 percent of state 
 
61  Lodge, “A Trade Partnership” (see note 55), 24. 
62  ECLAC points out that the CARICOM states have fixed very 
high multilateral tariffs for this reason: up to 100 percent for 
agricultural products, up to 50 percent for finished goods. 
These upper limits exceed the average bound tariffs of devel-
oping countries or the Caribbean market. ECLAC and Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD), Development Paths in the 
Caribbean (New York: United Nations, December 2012), 28, 
www.afd.fr/webdav/shared/PORTAILS/PAYS/ALC/pdf/Etude-
CEPALC-Development-paths.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 
63  Ibid., 29. 
64  The importance of the state revenue factor for protection-
ist measures was consistently apparent in discussions with 
Caribbean governments, regional institutions, businesses and 
academics. For example, it was mentioned that Trinidad and 
Tobago had proposed lowering the import duty on pharma-
ceutical products, despite itself being the only Caribbean 
country producing medicines. The idea was rejected within 
revenues in only three CARIFORUM states and the pro-
cess is to be spread over a period of twenty-five years.65 
But dependency on duties leads to political decisions 
that have negative effects on trade flows and economic 
stability.66 Some countries have begun reforming their 
tax systems to create alternative sources of revenue, 
mainly by introducing or increasing value added tax. 
In this they receive support above all from the Carib-
bean Regional Technical Assistance Centre of the IMF 
(CARTAC), whose contributors include the European 
Commission and Canada. It would be important for 
these reforms to be continued and the results imple-
mented consistently, in order for regional integration 
to make progress.67 Further intra-Caribbean trade lib-
eralisation depends also on the smaller OECS states 
succeeding in reducing their dependency on customs 
revenues and thus separating trade from fiscal policy. 
There are, however, good reasons to actually imple-
ment the regional preference clause. Firstly, the effects 
on local production would probably not be as severe as 
some governments fear; even without regional liber-
alisation (and thus not as a consequence of the EPA), 
CARICOM imports from the Dominican Republic al-
most doubled between 2007 and 2013. But at the same 
time CARICOM countries were able to increase their 
exports to the Dominican Republic,68 which is already 
one of the most important trading partners of the 
 
CARICOM because medical imports produce significant cus-
toms revenues.  
65  Sacha Silva cites three reasons for what might appear a 
surprisingly low figure: 1. The fact that no Caribbean state 
(apart from Suriname) receives more than 15 percent of its 
imports from the EU; 2. Incremental liberalisation and excep-
tions; 3. Declining importance of the EU as a trading partner 
in comparison to Asia and the United States. Silva, “‘Mix Up 
Matrimony’” (see note 11), 69. 
66  One interviewee in Barbados complained that the intro-
duction of a 70 percent duty on beer imports in St. Lucia – ab-
solutely in accord with internal CARICOM rules – was forcing 
him out of the market. The original, perhaps positive, devel-
opment-driven intention of protecting local production had, 
he said, been turned on its head because he, the beer exporter 
from Barbados, was a small local producer, while it was a 
multinational operating in St. Lucia. The decision to impose 
this particular tariff was reversed a few weeks later following 
bilateral inter-governmental talks. 
67  Interviewees reported that switching to tax-based revenue 
systems sometimes led to a fall in revenues, because interven-
tion by lobby groups produced legislation containing numer-
ous exemptions. In one case a low rate of value added tax was 
introduced on a trial basis, but the rate was not subsequently 
increased, nor was the additional revenue used to reduce 
tariffs. 
68  Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 95. 
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Caribbean Community. At the same time the C-EPA 
takes account of existing sensitivities, in that most of 
domestic production in the OECS states and products 
that are sensitive under the aspect of state revenues 
are excluded from liberalisation anyway; also, almost 
all OECS imports from the Dominican Republic are 
non-agricultural. All the same, five thousand tariff 
lines in the OECS states are affected by the new mar-
ket access granted to the Dominican Republic.69 Their 
liberalisation would barely affect domestic produc-
tion; the hesitation of governments to apply Article 
238 is therefore a clear indication that at least a part 
of the tariff system continues to serve to secure state 
revenues. 
As long as the regional preference clause is not in 
fact applied in full, there is also a danger of trade 
diversion benefiting the European Union,70 an effect 
that is of course highly undesirable under the aspect 
of sustainable development in the region. At least in 
the scope of the common CARICOM market, the Carib-
bean states are seeking a further liberalisation in the 
region.71 Introducing a new dynamic into implemen-
tation of the regional integration agenda through the 
C-EPA was, as already mentioned, specifically an im-
portant motivation of the CRNM negotiators. 
Article 238 also plays an important role in the over-
all construction of the EPA. The Dominican Republic 
has taken upon itself a large part of the liberalisation 
towards the European Union, opening 95 percent of 
its market in goods (in terms of weighted tariff lines) 
and 90 percent of its service sector. This has consider-
able consequences for the overall structure of the 
agreement. On the one hand, it gives the CARICOM 
states the possibility to open their markets corre-
spondingly less yet still reach the overall 80 percent 
target that the European Union regards as necessary 
under WTO rules. In the service sector for example, 
the more developed CARICOM states open 75 percent 
of their markets, the LDCs 65 percent. However CARI-
COM’s overall smaller liberalisation concessions under 
 
69  Silva, Caribbean Trade Integration after the West Indian 
Commission (see note 6), 19. 
70  Using an econometric model, Singh et al., Monitoring (see 
note 9), 95, identify a small trade diversion to the detriment 
of the CARIFORUM countries. 
71  See also Lodge, “A Trade Partnership” (see note 55), 19–42, 
who points out the consistency of Article 238 (regional pre-
ference clause) with the most-favoured treatment clause in 
Article 8 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas of 2001, which 
provides for CARICOM to develop into a common internal 
market. 
the EPA also limit the extent of their opening to the 
Dominican Republic. In return for its concessions to 
the European Union, the Dominican Republic was 
interested in a further opening of the CARICOM mar-
ket to its exports, with the assistance of the regional 
integration clause. It also highly values the formal 
framework that the C-EPA offers for dialogue and 
cooperation with CARICOM, and especially also with 
Haiti, with which it shares an island and close eco-
nomic ties. Non-implementation of Article 238 throws 
this entire construction out of balance. 
Effects of EPA Implementation on 
Regional Integration 
In the C-EPA the participating Caribbean states agree, 
through the clauses described above, to deepen re-
gional integration and to employ the institutional 
framework of the agreement to that end. As far as 
CARICOM cooperation with the Dominican Republic 
is concerned, the agreement is valuable to the extent 
that it offers a stable structure for regular meetings 
and a continuous dialogue. The EPA initiates coopera-
tion processes in many areas that will advance regional 
cooperation. Support through development funds is 
foreseen. 
At the level of functional cooperation, successes can 
already be identified, as demonstrated by the example 
of professional qualifications for architects.72 Regional 
cooperation on technical barriers to trade is also pro-
moted by the EPA. Harmonisation of technical stan-
dards by the CARICOM Regional Organisation for 
Standards and Quality (CROSQ) has certainly made 
progress, as have efforts to create a regional quality 
infrastructure with international recognition. Not 
least, the interviewed stakeholders also regarded coop-
eration between the CARICOM states and the Domini-
can Republic as positive, emphasising for example the 
signing of a memorandum of understanding between 
CROSQ and INDOCAL (Instituto Dominicano de Quali-
dad). Those involved value the pragmatic, need-driven 
cooperation on technical questions. 
But existing governance structures within the 
region are poorly suited to promoting the implemen-
tation of the EPA and resolving problems of regional 
economic integration extending beyond functional 
cooperation, in particular the challenges associated 
with Article 238. 
 
72  See the section on liberalisation of services, pp. 13ff. 
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Although the CARICOM secretariat plays a role as a 
motor of integration, without the right of proposal it 
lacks an essential instrument. Consensus decision-
making also hampers faster progress. But changes in 
this institutional setting would demand a certain 
renunciation of sovereignty. The UN Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean believes 
that “an executive authority with powers to imple-
ment, question and propose” would be required to 
advance integration,73 an opinion shared by several 
interview partners. Many interviewees in the region 
regard the situation as unsatisfactory and inefficient, 
but doubt that the political will exists within CARI-
COM to create the necessary governance structures. 
The CARIFORUM secretariat is in the same situation 
with respect to EPA implementation and deepening 
cooperation between CARICOM and the Dominican 
Republic as the CARICOM secretariat in the question 
of further integration of the Caribbean Community. 
The CARIFORUM EPA Implementation Unit sees itself 
as a coordinator, but does not possess a mandate to 
actively drive EPA implementation and further 
regional integration. While its personnel is widely 
regarded as highly qualified and engaged, the secre-
tariat as an institution is perceived as rather bureau-
cratic and slow, because all its decisions require 
consultation and approval of all member states. 
Owen Arthur, former prime minister of Barbados, 
recently proposed setting up a new independent 
institution that would be better equipped to advance 
regional integration processes.74 After conclusion of 
the EPA, the CRNM, which was able to operate much 
more independently during the talks, was confronted 
with accusations that it had operated too autono-
mously and that the agreed liberalisation went too far. 
It was subsequently restructured and integrated into 
the CARICOM secretariat as the Office of Trade Nego-
tiations. In the process the connection to the Domini-
can Republic was lost, because it does not belong to 
the Caribbean Community. As a consequence, CARI-
COM and the Dominican Republic are now negotiat-
ing separately over free trade areas with Canada. 
Many interviewees in the region regard the period 
of the EPA negotiations as the high-point of regional 
integration efforts. That is certainly also a reflection 
 
73  ECLAC, Development Paths (see note 62), 30. 
74  See the video of Owen Arthur’s speech of 19 January 2015, 
published by the Institute of International Relations, Univer-
sity of the West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago, 
www.livestream.com/iirtv/video?clipId=pla_cd7fdaae-0b7f-
4721-a256-2afad34676b1 (accessed 17 June 2015). 
of the extraordinary engagement of the CRNM. The 
positive attitude to integration has flowed into the 
EPA. In many areas the agreement promotes function-
al cooperation in the region, also between CARICOM 
and the Dominican Republic. The regional integration 
clause (Art. 238) creates great potential to advance 
trade integration in both goods and services. The 
existence of the EPA practically forces the participat-
ing Caribbean states into an ongoing dialogue and far-
reaching coordination, with the EPA institutions pro-
viding the required framework. 
Fundamentally therefore, the agreement can con-
tribute to a deepening of integration. But scepticism 
has grown in the region as to whether this is actually 
wanted. Not only was the Dominican Republic’s now 
third application to join CARICOM rejected in 2013, 
but the free trade talks with Canada are, as already 
mentioned, being conducted separately,75 and the 
CARICOM processes of creating a CSME internal mar-
ket are also proceeding at a crawl. Further integration 
will, however, depend on overcoming insular thinking 
and presupposes political will. Critical reflection here 
is certainly occurring in the region. 
 
 
75  Ivan Ogando, former CARIFORUM secretary-general, 
comes to sceptical conclusions concerning the relationship 
between CARICOM and the Dominican Republic: “While the 
European regional development cooperation has played, 
plays and will play for the next few years, a key role in bring-
ing CARICOM and DR together, today it is unlikely that CARI-
FORUM would survive without EDF support. A DR Member-
ship in CARICOM is not eminent and, political rhetoric aside, 
it seems that both parties have not yet fully realised that they 
need to go beyond EU cooperation and learn to rely on their 
own efforts and initiatives to guarantee a sustainable and 
mutual beneficial relationship among themselves.” 
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The Development Aspect in the C-EPA 
 
According to the objective laid down in the Cotonou 
Agreement, the EPA is strongly characterised by a 
desire to promote sustainable development. This novel 
approach was of great interest to the CARIFORUM 
states.76 Part I of the agreement describes how aspects 
of sustainable development are to be included in the 
agreement. Article 1 (a) names working to reduce 
poverty as the first objective of the agreement, even 
before regional integration (b) and trade and econom-
ic goals (c–f). This lays the basis for making the idea of 
development a cross-cutting theme throughout the 
agreement. Monitoring (Art. 5) is emphasised as an 
important instrument to ensure realisation of the 
stated intentions, as is development cooperation 
(Art. 7), whose priorities are also listed (Art. 8). The 
“Joint Declaration on Development Cooperation” an-
nexed to the agreement also addresses the leitmotif of 
sustainable development. The idea that trade policy is 
not an end in itself, but must serve higher political 
goals such as fighting poverty, is thus firmly anchored 
in the agreement. 
Aid for Trade 
Trade liberalisation does not automatically lead to 
growth and reduce poverty. It can only contribute to 
sustainable development under specific circumstances 
and with the appropriate arrangements. The principal 
challenges are: 
 Lack of capacity for negotiating and implementing 
trade agreements in governments, administrations, 
parliaments and private sector, as well as in the 
civil societies accompanying the processes.  
 Low competitiveness of goods and services; and lack 
of capacity in the private sector; and in connection 
with that, scant opportunity to use additional mar-
ket access to actually increase exports. 
 Deficits in trade-related infrastructure, including 
quality infrastructure. 
 Weak capacity of states to facilitate adjustment pro-
cesses, for example through incentives for restruc- 
 
 
76  Lodge, “A Trade Partnership” (see note 55), 26. 
turing, subsidisation of adjustment costs, and above 
all through social security. 
Various donors supplied funds for implementation 
of the EPA. The European Parliament believes the 
€ 580 million supplied (up to 2013) to be adequate to 
cover the most important priorities.77 The European 
Union rejected the anchoring of additional develop-
ment funding in the agreement originally sought by 
the Caribbean states (additionality) on the grounds 
that structures and negotiating mechanisms already 
existed in the field of development cooperation, in 
particular because significant EDF funds lay untapped 
during the funding period. On the other hand the 
“Joint Declaration” explicitly mentions adjustment 
needs in the CARIFORUM states and declares that 
€ 165 million (until 2014) will be provided in the 10th 
European Development Fund, roughly a tripling of the 
previous figure.78 The Joint Declaration also proposes 
the establishment of a “Regional Development Fund”. 
Implementation of most of the programmes did not 
begin until summer 2012, with the exception of the 
private sector development programme, which the 
Caribbean Export Development Agency has been 
running since March 2011. About one quarter of the 
funds foreseen have already flowed.79 
Germany and the United Kingdom are the only EU 
member states contributing bilateral development 
cooperation to support EPA implementation. The 
German funding is highly regarded in the region. In 
2007 Germany pledged € 5 million for this purpose: 
€ 4 million through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), € 1 million 
through the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt 
(PTB) as implementing organisation for quality infra-
structure. In 2015 the GIZ programme was increased 
by another € 1 million. While it is not planned to con-
tinue either programme beyond 2015, it is not impos-
 
77  European Parliament, The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partner-
ship Agreement (EPA): The Development Component (Brussels, April 
2009), 46. 
78  European Commission, Information Paper CARIFORUM-EU 
(see note 10), 21. 
79  For a detailed overview of ongoing development activities, 
see Singh et al., Monitoring (see note 9), 23ff. 
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sible that EPA implementation issues will be included 
under the existing development priority of energy. 
The “Joint Declaration” on development coopera-
tion, which is part of the C-EPA, includes a statement 
that “the funds allocated to the Caribbean Regional 
Indicative Programme (CRIP) in the 10th EDF are to 
be complemented by Aid for Trade contributions by 
Member States of the European Union”.80 The CARI-
FORUM member states consequently expected support 
for EPA implementation to come from all EU member 
states, and there is great disappointment that this has 
not occurred. All the more clearly is it noted, as many 
interview partners underlined, that Germany has 
proven itself a credible and reliable partner through 
its rapid engagement in the region. Aside from the 
development sense of assisting the partners to imple-
ment the agreement, the intervention can also be 
regarded as diplomatically productive, especially in 
view of the many Caribbean votes in the UN system. 
Aid for trade played a major role in creating and 
strengthening institutions during the talks, and above 
all after their conclusion. As well as CROSQ (via the 
PTB), the German EPA project largely supported the 
EPA units, coordinating offices set up under the agree-
ment in all member states and at CARIFORUM. Ger-
many for example funded the preparation of the 
regional “roadmap” for EPA implementation, as well 
as a number of national versions, websites to familiar-
ise the public with the content of the agreement, 
information brochures for the private sector, regional 
workshops for information exchange between the 
countries, and a computerised implementation net-
work within the region, the CAFEIN website, which 
especially smaller countries find very helpful. The 
discussions around the setting up of the EPA units and 
their establishment within the governments, and 
their actual activities, have contributed greatly to 
making the agreement better known and promoted 
the implementation process in some of the countries. 
However, if the EPA units are to operate success-
fully, certain structural challenges will have to be 
tackled. One absolutely decisive question for their 
effectiveness is how these units are administratively 
configured and where they are organisationally 
attached. Certain EPA units are departments of their 
own, mostly located in trade ministries, some of them 
consisting of just a single person. They are reliant on 
 
80  Joint Declaration on Development Cooperation, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/ 
tradoc_137971.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 
other administrative units to execute their proposals, 
without having any power over them. In this situation 
their success depends heavily on what reputation and 
political support the EPA unit enjoys. Barbados is a 
positive example. This type of organisation becomes 
problematic where other government departments are 
dealing with the implementation of other free trade 
agreements. Such a construction makes it difficult to 
shape a coherent external trade policy, because dif-
ferent units are ultimately all dealing with the same 
issues, and the implementation of FTAs demands iden-
tical legislative changes (for example customs liberali-
sation), affecting the same institutions (customs ad-
ministration). Certain governments (Dominican 
Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, also Guyana) have 
therefore decided to implement the EPA through the 
existing structures of their trade departments, in 
order to ensure coherent executive action. Here devel-
opment cooperation should avoid setting false incen-
tives, such as tying financial support for implementa-
tion to the creation of new institutions. Although this 
has not explicitly occurred, several national adminis-
trations assumed such a connection, and the assump-
tion favoured the decision to establish separate EPA 
units. Another condition for the units to operate suc-
cessfully, which especially the smaller countries find 
hard to satisfy, is long-term security of resources and 
personnel. 
The creation of a new regional fund is not yet under 
discussion, although exactly that intention is laid 
down in the “Joint Declaration”. The Caribbean coun-
tries may assume, probably justifiably, that a new 
fund would be no guarantee of new money but would 
certainly create additional administrative costs. Practi-
cal cooperation over implementation might also have 
demonstrated that articulated support needs can be 
met using existing instruments. 
Alongside governments and administrations, pri-
vate-sector capacities are an important issue for aid for 
trade. An agreement will only create new trade flows 
if actors in the private sector are aware of the new 
possibilities and interested in additional imports and 
exports. The participating governments are usually in 
contact with the private sector while trade negotia-
tions are still under way, and in parallel seek dialogue 
with civil society, because small producers – who in 
some cases possess no organisation of their own – also 
need to be informed of the opportunities and risks of 
the agreement, given the opportunity to contribute 
their opinions, and be involved in a substantive ex-
change about possible effects. In this spirit the CRNM 
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conducted numerous consultations with all stake-
holders between 2004 and 2007, complementing mem-
ber states’ activities. The success of these activities 
was, however, limited.81 
Other programmes aim directly to promote the 
private sector, in particular increasing competitive-
ness and exportability. For example, through the 
Caribbean Export development agency the European 
Union and Germany enabled Caribbean businesses to 
attend the Anuga food fair in Cologne and in the 
Berlin Fashion Week. These visits produced concrete 
export perspectives for a beer exporter, a sauce ex-
porter, and for fashion companies. 
Interviewees from the region repeatedly underlined 
the importance of a functioning quality infrastructure 
for product competitiveness and opening up foreign 
markets. Forty-eight chapters of the EPA relate to 
regional norms, making this area an important issue 
for aid for trade to address. The European Union has 
provided €7.8 million for improving quality infra-
structure through the EDF in a project conducted by 
the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) joint-
ly with the Caribbean agencies CROSQ and INDOCAL. 
The EU and German quality infrastructure projects 
complement one another. While the EDF is more 
directed towards policy advice, the PTB supports the 
development of value chains and quality infrastruc-
ture services. 
So to what extent can aid for trade actually help 
developing countries to make better use of the oppor-
tunities offered by free trade agreements? Theoretical 
studies attribute fundamentally good outcomes to aid 
for trade.82 But a comprehensive evaluation of EU sup-
port for the Caribbean comes to a more differentiated 
conclusion: while EU resources were central to the 
success of the EPA talks, their success in improving 
the competitiveness of Caribbean businesses was 
patchy.83 The businesses and representatives of 
national and regional organisations interviewed for 
this study repeatedly underlined the importance of 
practical support, both in view of stretched state 
budgets but above all also for communicating skills, 
knowledge and structured information about the 
German and European markets. Development coop-
eration is often important for setting processes in 
 
81  Silva, “‘Mix Up Matrimony’” (see note 11), 60. 
82  For example Ruth Hoekstra and Georg Koopmann, “Aid 
for Trade and the Liberalization of Trade”, Journal of World 
Trade 46, no. 2 (2012): 327–66. 
83  Jean-Marie Burgaud et al., Region Level Evaluation – Caribbean 
Region (August 2012). 
motion,84 and dialogue and cooperation initiated 
through development projects also frequently form 
the basis for later cooperation and business contacts. 
In this context the importance of development policy 
for aspects of regional cooperation and integration 
should not be underestimated; the establishment of 
the CARIFORUM secretariat and support for the Carib-
bean rum sector are especially pertinent examples. 
Resonance for German EPA support is also very posi-
tive. Many interviewees confirmed that German devel-
opment aid channelled through the GIZ contributed 
centrally to making the EPA known in the institutions 
and private sectors of the Caribbean states (for example 
through a workshop with regional media, through the 
development of a strategy for advocacy work, and 
through the funding of brochures) and to increasing 
acceptance and interest in the private sector. As such 
it lent decisive support to the work of the CARIFORUM 
secretariat and to the responsible government depart-
ments. The ProNet training programme, which pro-
motes capacity-building in the field of commerce, was 
singled out for very specifically addressing the needs 
of the private sector. The work of the PTB in setting up 
a quality infrastructure for fulfilling norms and stan-
dards received exceptional praise, because the deficits 
in this area are perceived as the central obstacle to 
Caribbean exports to the European Union and to 
regional trade. German development cooperation was 
especially popular, because it was said to be more 
partner-orientated and flexible than the European 
Union. 
The interviewed stakeholders also expressed wishes 
and criticisms relating to the substance and processes 
of development cooperation in general (thus also of 
other donors and multilateral actors): 
 The benefits of aid for trade should be distributed 
as widely as possible, they said. Where projects 
work with individual businesses, information and 
lessons learned need to be made broadly available, 
and participating businesses need to be fairly 
selected using objective criteria. Capacity problems 
and advice needs were also reported at the level of 
associations. 
 Attention to broader impacts is pertinent when 
advising state instances, as one example of support 
through EPA units illustrates: It only took a few 
adaptations to make a brochure about the EPA 
 
84  One interviewee said that the region was “at a critical 
point. Some capacity has been created. Either you continue to 
push it or nothing will happen.” 
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produced for Barbados usable for other countries 
too. 
 There was great interest in structured, accessible 
information (websites, handbooks, brochures, etc.) 
about the German and European markets and their 
institutions (including chambers of commerce, 
associations, import institutions). 
 A more strategic and longer-term approach to 
measures for strengthening competitiveness and 
identifying market opportunities would be desir-
able, interviewees said. The same also applies to the 
actual process of tapping new markets and all the 
accompanying steps along the value chain. As far as 
one-off activities such as workshops, trade fair par-
ticipation, etc. are concerned, a certain weariness 
was discernible. Fragmentation of resources, spo-
radic availability of funds and fluctuating person-
nel were named as further problems in develop-
ment cooperation. All this, it was said, made it 
harder to advance “enterprise development” in the 
long term. 
 The PTB’s so-called CALIDENA approach (calidad = 
quality, cadena = chain) is a method for improving 
quality in all stages of the value chain. Partners 
praised the effects of this instrument, but also 
wished it went further. Building on the PTB consul-
tation, companies could participate in trade fairs 
and then (via the GIZ) be assisted with follow-up 
and concrete marketing of their products. Coopera-
tion with business organisations, chambers of 
commerce and the relatively new German Import 
Promotion Desk would also be conceivable in the 
scope of such development programmes. 
 Requirements placed upon local partners must be 
realistic. Especially in smaller countries, interview-
ees said that there was already a lack of the capaci-
ties required to prepare project proposals. These are 
frequently developed by paid consultants, but 
where financial resources and capacities are espe-
cially stretched this may become an obstacle to 
accessing project funding at all. This problem is 
described in an evaluation of the UK-
funded Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional 
Integration Trust Fund (CARTFUND) by the Interna-
tional Centre for Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment (ICTSD). It turned out that the advisers 
CARTFUND provides to handle project proposals are 
crucial, since without them most proposals would 
have been rejected for falling short of stated quality 
requirements.85 Donors should consequently al-
ready be taking the situation of the recipients into 
account at the planning stage, in order to enable all 
potential target groups to access support. It was 
also mentioned that demanding partner contribu-
tions from micro-firms (for example in the agricul-
tural sector) may be prohibitive for the existence of 
a project, if they have no access to funding. 
 Result-orientation and cost-benefit analysis should 
be strengthened. In many projects the indicators for 
assessing the impact of EPA support are themselves, 
interviewees reported, too vague to actually meas-
ure success. But good indicators are a precondition 
for meaningful performance measurement. 
 Not least, interviewees expressed a wish to main-
tain the German EPA support. It became clear that 
interest exists in cooperation per se, not just in the 
scope of development policy. Given that most of 
the Caribbean states are middle-income countries 
under the UN classification, international donors 
have largely pulled out of development cooperation 
with individual states. Such projects as are still 
there are generally operating at the regional level. 
In this context help in implementing the EPA is 
also regarded as a signal that Germany does in fact 
take note of the Caribbean countries, and is valued 
as German interest in the region. 
Monitoring and EPA Institutions 
From the outset both the Caribbean side, including 
the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) as 
the umbrella organisation of Caribbean NGOs,86 and 
the EU member states,87 demonstrated great interest 
in introducing innovative monitoring mechanisms. 
The idea was that close scrutiny of the implementa-
tion process would permit early detection of negative 
effects and appropriate counter-measures. Article 246, 
the revision clause, permits modification of the agree-
ment on the basis of experience gained in the scope 
of implementation. The monitoring system itself is 
spelled out in Article 5. Although Germany had a com-
 
85  Henry S. Gill, Caribbean Aid for Trade and the Regional Integra-
tion Trust Fund (CARTFund), Policy Brief 4 (Geneva: ICTSD, May 
2011), 3. 
86  Lodge, “A Trade Partnership” (see note 55), 35. 
87  Council of the European Union, Economic Partnership Agree-
ments – Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council, 
15109/07 (Brussels, 20 November 2007). 
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prehensive study prepared on this complex,88 the dis-
cussion about the monitoring mechanism only really 
got going properly at the end of 2014, after its impor-
tance was reiterated in the EPA review and CARI-
FORUM responded to a much earlier proposal from 
the European Commission. 
A series of institutions play important roles in 
implementing the agreement: The Joint CARIFORUM-
EC Council, the highest organ at ministerial level 
(Art. 227), is supported by the Trade and Development 
Committee (TDC, Art. 230), which meets annually at 
senior official level. These institutions discuss all 
questions connected with the EPA, including prob-
lems with products incorrectly included in liberalisa-
tion and, in November 2014, the non-implementation 
of the regional integration clause (Art. 238). Stake-
holders described the TDC as a well-functioning and 
adequate forum for handling implementation dif-
ficulties. The Parliamentary Committee (Art. 231) 
draws on the Lomé and Cotonou tradition of involving 
parliaments in such agreements. 
The truly innovative institution, however, is the 
Consultative Committee (Art. 232), which is composed 
of representatives of civil society, academics, and the 
social and business partners, and is entitled to make 
recommendations to the EPA Council and the Trade 
and Development Committee. The Consultative Com-
mittee met for the first time at the end of 2014, after 
CARIFORUM required a great deal of time to appoint 
its delegates. The interviewed stakeholders welcomed 
its establishment and the associated possibility of 
influencing implementation, as well as ensuring that 
the EPA’s objectives of social sustainability and pover-
ty reduction are actually carried through. However, 
fears were also expressed that the Consultative Com-
mittee would have little impact if it met only once a 
year. 
The Consultative Committee should play an im-
portant role in the emerging monitoring system. It is 
an extremely positive start to have an institution 
established within the EPA that represents all stake-
holders and is thus in a good position to gather and 
pass on information about impacts and problems. The 
Consultative Committee could also be explicitly given 
such tasks as the monitoring procedure takes shape. 
As such, the members of the Consultative Committee 
could strengthen the connection to the societies of the 
 
88  Michael Brüntrup et al., Monitoring Economic Partnership 
Agreements: Inputs to the Negotiations and Beyond (Bonn and 
Maastricht: DIE/ECDPM, 2008). 
CARIFORUM partner states. At the same time, in the 
context of monitoring, a discussion in the various 
stakeholder circles would deepen knowledge about 
the agreement and thus contribute to strengthening 
capacities that are in turn required for constructive 
accompaniment of the agreement. However taking on 
such tasks would require more frequent meetings, 
better funding and possibly the formation of subcom-
mittees. 
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Lessons from the CARIFORUM-EU EPA and Conclusions 
 
Contribution to Development and 
Poverty-reduction 
The CARIFORUM-EU EPA is the first free trade agree-
ment where the idea of sustainable development runs 
throughout its provisions. It satisfies the theoretical 
criteria that one would lay down for an agreement to 
serve poverty-reduction and sustainable development 
and promote regional integration: 
Real market access for developing countries: With 
completely free market access, the C-EPA has created a 
precedent that developing countries can cite in free 
trade talks with other industrialised countries. 
Asymmetrical liberalisation: The market opening 
instituted by the C-EPA is asymmetrical and takes 
account of the different levels of development of the 
partners. Whether the degree of opening is adequate 
to contribute to sustainable development will be seen 
in practice, and should be examined closely in the 
monitoring process. 
Safeguards and flexibility for developing coun-
tries: The C-EPA contains an asymmetrical and un-
usually flexible safeguard clause and the possibility 
for the CARIFORUM region to adapt elements of the 
agreement should liberalisation create problems. The 
safeguards still have to demonstrate their effectiveness 
in the course of implementation. 
Review and monitoring: The agreement itself speci-
fies initial monitoring processes and contains innova-
tive institutional mechanisms (above all the Consul-
tative Committee) for following up implementation. 
The C-EPA is the first free trade agreement to provide 
for the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring 
system. 
Sustainability and development as cross-cutting 
themes: Social and ecological issues are taken into 
account throughout the agreement. 
Integration of “new topics” in the service of sus-
tainable development: The C-EPA demonstrates new 
ways to introduce so-called WTO+ topics into a free 
trade agreement with the objective of contributing to 
sustainable development. Firstly, the Caribbean side 
only made substantive commitments where these were 
clearly in its own interests; whether the underlying 
assumptions were correct will again only become clear 
in the course of implementation and monitoring. 
Secondly, commitments under the agreement are tied 
to the granting of aid for trade, where the necessary 
capacities are not yet present. Thus, for example, 
implementation of commitments on geographical 
indications is tied to support through development 
aid. Thirdly, wherever possible, the agreement has 
been configured in such a way as to strengthen the 
regional integration process. Fourthly, innovative 
arrangements are defined; for example, the chapter 
on investment contains duties concerning the be-
haviour of investors. Other chapters regulate, fifthly, 
cooperation, information exchange, technology trans-
fer and development cooperation (for example tech-
nical barriers to trade and SPS), without demanding 
substantial commitments (for example expanded 
market access) in return. 
Consideration for regional integration agenda 
and contribution to integration: The entire EPA and 
the mechanisms it defines, including the negotiations 
that created it, contribute to a deepening of coopera-
tion and integration within the Caribbean region. The 
state of regional integration, which a number of inter-
viewees certainly regarded as inadequate, determined 
the agenda of the talks at many points. 
Centrality of aid for trade: Supporting the CRNM 
through external funding of highly qualified staff was 
of central importance in the negotiating phase. The 
agreement itself innovatively combines provisions on 
trade liberalisation, reforms and institution-building 
with an analysis of capacity bottlenecks and support 
through aid for trade. 
All these elements can serve as a model for combin-
ing development angles with free trade objectives in 
negotiations over other agreements between develop-
ing and industrialised countries. But the innovative 
character of the C-EPA is heavily conditioned by the 
special historical relationship between the Caribbean 
and the European Union and the blueprint laid out in 
the Cotonou Agreement, which fundamentally stipu- 
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lated a development-led orientation.89 The African and 
Pacific regions also negotiated EPAs with the Euro-
pean Union from the same starting situation. But for 
many other countries that context does not exist. 
Politically, the EPA is increasingly valued in the Carib-
bean, especially in light of the fate of free trade talks 
with other partners. The African countries should 
consider whether they do not wish to claim the pos-
sibilities that the C-EPA offers in certain areas – even 
without market access pledges – in the framework of 
the built-in agenda, which is also a part of their EPAs, 
which demands dialogue over new issues. 
Another basic condition for what is regarded as the 
(very) positive outcome of the CARIFORUM-EU talks is 
not necessarily present elsewhere: the existence of 
leadership, ownership and an active interest in nego-
tiating an agreement for the benefit of the region, 
which existed in the region at the time and all of 
which characterised the CRNM negotiators. They saw 
EPA as an opportunity to contribute incrementally to 
improving the productivity of Caribbean producers 
and advancing regional integration and diversifica-
tion of its production and export structures. The suc-
cessive loss of formerly extensive trade preferences for 
traditional exports such as sugar, bananas and rice is 
regretted, but agreement is there that a sustainable 
growth perspective must rest on new and different 
economic pillars. 
That kind of perspective is not necessari-
ly encountered in other regions, but it is nonetheless 
possible to draw generalisable lessons out of the 
negotiating and stakeholder processes. First of all, 
developing countries should not hesitate to draw on 
external support, even in the phase before and during 
negotiations, to clarify their own interests and 
positions. External support should be configured to 
ensure neutral advice and strengthen capacities within 
the region (where possible in the form of local experts). 
Secondly, it is important to involve stakeholders at an 
early stage in discussing and defining negotiating 
positions, as this will have a positive effect on the 
content and later acceptance of the agreement, and on 
interest in its implementation. External donors also 
have a contribution to make here. 
 
89  For an overview of the Cotonou Agreement, see Dietmar 
Nickel, Was kommt nach Cotonou? Die Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen der EU und den Afrika-, Karibik- und Pazifikstaaten, SWP-
Studie 13/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
June 2012). 
Implementation: Maximise Opportunities, 
Minimise Risks 
Even the best free trade agreement cannot guarantee 
new trade flows, poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. CARIFORUM stakeholders emphasised in 
interviews that their expectations of the C-EPA may 
have been too great. An agreement cannot do more 
than create a legal framework and institutional basis 
for processes that actors must initiate themselves: 
Governments must carry through reforms and private 
actors must also (be able to) make use of new market 
opportunities. Development aid can provide support, 
but the willingness to reform and the will to change 
must be present. A series of processes were initiated 
in the CARIFORUM member states to implement the 
agreement and modest new trade flows have ap-
peared. To date, at the same time, there have been no 
market dislocations attributable to the liberalisation 
towards the European Union. One reason for this is 
that, in line with the asymmetrical construct of the 
agreement, CARIFORUM has so far only had to permit 
a very limited market opening, and even that has been 
partially delayed. But the interest European exporters 
have shown in the small Caribbean islands is also 
limited. It will not really be possible to draw conclu-
sions about the effects of the agreement until the 
transitional periods have expired. But certain conclu-
sions can still be drawn from the experience to date, 
both for ongoing C-EPA implementation and for free 
trade agreements with developing countries in 
general. 
Informing and involving stakeholders is central for owner-
ship and impact. Although much energy was devoted to 
stakeholder consultations, with numerous opportuni-
ties ongoing in the implementation phase, parts of the 
private sector feel they know nothing about the EPA 
and have nothing to do with it. Stakeholders must be 
involved in all phases of an agreement (preparation, 
negotiation, implementation). Adequate means shall 
be foreseen through aid for trade. An exchange of ex-
perience between African EPA regions and CARIFORUM 
at the regional and national levels could be helpful in 
preparing EPA implementation in Africa. 
Aid for trade is of great importance for realising trade 
opportunities. The major objective of aid for trade pro-
grammes and projects is to initiate processes with 
longer-term effects. The interviewed stakeholders 
named the successive improvement of competitive-
ness of rum producers as an example of constructive 
European-Caribbean cooperation. Aid for trade goes 
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far beyond the provision of financial resources; it can 
also involve sharing of know-how that would not be 
available locally, or initiating processes of coopera-
tion. Some lessons for development cooperation ac-
companying free trade agreements should be briefly 
highlighted: 
 Prospective long-term support for improving pro-
ductivity along the entire value chain must corre-
late with an adequate planning perspective and 
requires close cooperation between different spe-
cialised development institutions, the state and the 
private sector. 
 The dissemination of experience from the projects 
must be integrated from the outset. Businesses 
and individuals participating in projects must be 
selected on the basis of fair criteria. 
 Cost-benefit considerations and instruments for 
measuring success should flow more strongly into 
project design (this begins with the definition of 
impact assessment indicators). 
 Capacities at all levels are important for imple-
menting a regional agreement. Regional organisa-
tions frequently fulfil a coordination and control 
function, but a large part of implementation occurs 
at the national level (ratification, drafting and 
implementing legislation, dialogue with the private 
sector). Aid for trade measures must therefore 
address both and be so designed as to ensure from 
the outset a sensible division of labour and mutual-
ly complementary activities. Planning processes in 
development cooperation institutions must com-
bine regional and national programmes, seeking 
constructive instrumental solutions and at least 
ensuring that the respective leaders remain in 
dialogue. 
Use the starting points the EPA offers for cooperation and 
exchange. Many of the issues covered by the agreement 
can only be brought to life through dialogue, coopera-
tion and exchange. If institutions and individuals fail 
to develop an interest and initiate processes, many 
chances will remain unused. The European Commis-
sion, the CARIFORUM secretariat, and the member 
states in both regions should consider which areas 
they are especially interested in and launch initiatives. 
The example of successful cooperation between the 
European Commission and the agriculture ministry of 
the Dominican Republic to resolve problems with SPS 
standards is encouraging. The possibilities of institu-
tional cooperation, at the level of expert organisations 
such as CROSQ as well as ministries, are far from ex-
hausted. The same applies to the private sector, with 
the positive example of cooperation in the architec-
ture sector.  
The EPA institutions and the nascent monitoring system 
should play a central role in implementation. Positive effects 
of the agreement should be maximised, negative de-
tected as early as possible and avoided. That requires 
first and foremost that the monitoring processes 
foreseen by the C-EPA actually be conducted. Then of 
course, there must be a willingness to draw conse-
quences on the basis of the collated information. The 
task of the EPA institutions is to follow the research 
and discuss the results and any adjustments that may 
become necessary in the implementation process. The 
institutions offer the forum for dialogue and problem-
solving. The effect of the Consultative Committee, for 
which there is no precedent in other agreements, is 
especially interesting. It should make full use of its 
broad mandate, especially with respect to keeping in 
focus the goals of poverty reduction and sustainable 
development set out in the agreement. In order for the 
Consultative Committee to be able to fulfil this task, it 
will be necessary to assign it a more active role and 
enable it to meet more frequently, in the interests of 
an ongoing and structured exchange. 
The monitoring system should build on the institu-
tional structures of the C-EPA. There is a great deal of 
experience with comparable monitoring processes, 
and for the C-EPA concepts are already available that 
should be taken into account in developing the 
mechanisms. In this connection transferring monitor-
ing tasks to the Consultative Committee should also 
be considered. It would be gratifying if the Consulta-
tive Committee were to become an important link to 
the societies of the CARIFORUM countries. The com-
mittee could both gather its own information and 
serve as a multiplier in discussions. That would re-
quire it being given a clear mandate within the moni-
toring system, clear structures (for example as a regu-
lar working party) and the necessary funding for co-
ordinating regional meetings, for national stakeholder 
participation and for such studies and information-
gathering as may become necessary. In view of the 
heterogeneity of the actors represented on the Con-
sultative Committee and what interviewed stake-
holders regard as poor regional coordination to date, 
this would certainly represent a great challenge. A 
realistic assignment of tasks would need to be under-
taken, not overstretching the Consultative Committee 
but creating incentives to intensify regional coopera-
tion and exchange between the various stakeholders. 
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Use the opportunities the C-EPA offers to promote regional 
integration. Whether this succeeds will depend largely 
on political will in the region. Implementation of the 
regional preference clause is central. Should it to 
prove impossible to implement the clause in full, 
trade diversion benefiting the European Union should 
at least be avoided. While investigations of the effects 
of the regional liberalisation are already under way, 
certain consultation capacities and discussion pro-
cesses will definitely be necessary to resolve existing 
problems. If necessary funding should be provided for 
this. The EPA institutions and above all the European 
Commission should actively encourage dialogue with-
in the region. 
Strengthening the mandate of the CARIFORUM 
secretariat in the context of EPA implementation 
could contribute to a simplification of processes and 
unleash a new dynamism. If the stakeholders are to be 
believed, national governments appear to express no 
great interest in this. This stands in contradiction to 
the broad awareness revealed in the interviews that in 
view of the small size of the CARICOM states in par-
ticular, integration and cooperation would be the best 
way to obtain greater economic and political weight. 
The possibility of expanding the capacity and mandate 
of the regional organisations or at least establishing a 
stronger regional division of labour (potentially on a 
case-by-case basis) to realise efficiency gains should be 
examined. This might at least be possible with regard 
to factual cooperation in specific areas or issues (such 
as aid for trade). 
The question of possible trade diversion benefiting 
the European Union and how to avoid it by imple-
menting a regional preference clause may arise in a 
similar form as soon as implementation begins in the 
African EPA regions. An early start should be made 
with analysis and developing solutions. 
Germany should continue to build on the reputation it 
enjoys in the region for its early engagement in EPA imple-
mentation. This does not necessarily mean providing 
development cooperation funds, although it would 
make sense to examine to what extent aspects of EPA 
implementation could be integrated into the existing 
energy and environment priorities, if an extension of 
the EPA implementation project is not possible. The 
German government (including other ministries as 
well as the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation 
and Development that is responsible for the EPA) 
should also explore other areas where the EPA may 
touch on potential shared German/Caribbean interests 
that could be handled at government level and/or at 
the level of associations or interest groups, with the 
objective of identifying concrete fields of cooperation. 
As well as environment and energy, the Protocol on 
Cultural Cooperation and other issues in the service 
sector also offer starting points. 
Successful implementation of a good agreement requires 
effort by all actors. Completely free access to the EU 
market for exports of goods has again granted the 
Caribbean countries far-reaching trade preferences. 
The region is aware that this is only a temporary ad-
vantage, in view of the European Union’s ongoing 
free trade talks with other regions. The opportunities 
offered by the EPA should therefore be grasped with-
out delay. Nor will the goal of reducing poverty and 
strengthening sustainable development come about 
on its own, but will require an active approach by all 
stakeholders. 
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Abbreviations 
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
CAFEIN CARIFORUM EPA Implementation Network 
CAFTA  Central America Free Trade Agreement 
CARICOM Caribbean Community 
CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States 
CARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (of 
the IMF) 
CARTFund Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional 
Integration Trust Fund 
CDB Caribbean Development Bank 
C-EPA Caribbean Economic Partnership Agreement 
CPDC Caribbean Policy Development Centre 
CROSQ CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards and 
Quality 
CRNM Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
CSME CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
DIE Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (Maastricht) 
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
EDF European Development Fund 
EPA Economic partnership agreement 
FTA Free trade agreement 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
INDOCAL Instituto Americano de Qualidad 
LDC Least developed country 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
PTB Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt 
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
TBT Technical barriers to trade 
TDC  Trade and Development Committee 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
